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COR1NELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXXIV WINTER, 1948 NUMBER 2
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
RULE 20
LESTER B.. ORFIELD
Rule .20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, entitled "Transfer
from the District for Plea and Sentence," provides as follows:
"A defendant arrested in a district other than that in which the
indictment or information is pending against him may state in writ-
ing, after receiving a copy of the indictment or information, that he
wishes to plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive the trial in the
district in which the indictment or information is pending and to
consent to disposition of the case in the district in which he was
arrested, subject to the approval of the United States attorneys for
each district.' Upon receipt of the defendant's statement and of the
approval of the United States attorneys, the clerk of the court in
which the indictment or information is pending shall transmit the
papers in the proceeding or certified copies thereof to the clerk of
the court for the district in which the defendant is held and the
prosecution shall continue in that district. If after the proceeding
has been transferred the defendant pleads not guilty, the clerk shall
return the papers to the court in which the prosecution was com-
menced and the proceedings shall be restored to the docket of that
court. The defendant's statement shall not be used against him
unless he was represented by counsel when it was made."
The Note of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal
Procedure states:
"This rule introduces a new procedure in the interest of defendants
who intend to plead guilty and are arrested in a district other than
that in which the prosecution has been instituted. This rule would
accord to a defendant in such a situation an opportunity to secure
a disposition of the case in the district where the arrest takes place,
thereby relieving him of whatever hardship may be involved in a
removal to the place where the prosecution is pending. In order to
prevent possible interference with the administration of justice,
however, the consent of the United States attorneys involved is
required."
This rule was found invalid by Federal District Judge James Alger
Fee in United States v. Bink.1 Colleen Schwindt was indicted for forgery
174 F. Supp. 603 (D. Ore. 1947), 28 B. U. L. REV. 230, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 443; Notes,
48 COL. L. REv. 939, 36 GEo. L. J. 263, 46 Mitcr. L. REv. 964, 16 U. or Cm. L. REv. 187.
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by a federal grand jury sitting in the Northern Division of the District
of South Dakota. Subsequently, the cause was transferred to the southern
division for trial by an order dated February 20, 1946. The defendant
was arrested in Oregon, where she signed a written document stating
that she wished to plead guilty in Oregon. With the consent of the United
States Attorneys of both districts, the original indictment was transferred
from South Dakota to Oregon. The District Court in Oregon was asked
by the United States Attorney for Oregon to receive the plea of the
defendant, and if she should plead guilty, as indicated, to enter a judg-
ment of conviction and to pronounce sentence. The district judge denied
that he had jurisdiction to pass judgment and sentence on an indictment
found in another state and district, and held Rule 20 an improper
exercise of the rule-making power.
In a subsequent decision, the Oregon District Court refused to direct
its clerk of court to transmit to the Eastern District of Oklahoma, the
place of the arrest, the original papers, with respect to an indictment
found in Oregon.2 This time, however, the court rested its decision on
a failure to comply with the conditions precedent laid down in Rule 20.'
The court did not pass on the constitutionality of the Rule, nor refer
to the Bink case. Still later the court concluded that the conditions of
Rule 20 had finally been met, and therefore advised the clerk to forward
certified copies to the Eastern District of Oklahoma.4
The Oregon court is the only court which has treated Rule 20 (or any
other Criminal Rule) as unconstitutional.' The Indiana court found no
objection to a combination of waiver of indictment and waiver of venue.6
It ruled that the information may be filed where the prosecution started
and waiver of indictment may proceed in the district where the dispo-
sition is to be made. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
on March 1, 1948 applied Rule 20, without questioning its validity, to
a defendant indicted in Louisiana and arrested in the District of Co-
lumbia.7 Upon a plea of nolo contendere by such defendant the District
This is at least the third occasion on which district courts have refused to accept transfer
under Rule 20. Strine, The New Federal Criminal Rides in Action, 8 FED. B. J. 190,
192 (1947).2 Petition of Mundorff, 8 F. R. D. 7 (D. Ore. 1948).
SThe United States Attorney's request for a transfer of papers to the district of
defendant's arrest must establish that the defendant requesting transfer is the same person
against whom the indictment is pending. It must also show where the defendant is held
or whether he is held at all and who is the United States Attorney for the district of arrest.4United States v. Tollett, 76 F. Supp. 871 (D. Ore. 1948).5 The only other rule so far attacked as to constitutionality is Rule 7 (b) providing for
waiver of indictment. Its validity was upheld in Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592
(C. C. A. Sth 1947) ; Note, 21 So. CA=w. L. REv. 193 (1948). I shall discuss this case in
a forthcoming article in 21 RocxY MT. L. Rav. - (1948).
6United States v. East, 5 F. R. D. 389, 390 (N. D. Ind. 1946). Crime occurred in Penn-
sylvania and plea of guilty was in Indiana.7Singleton v. Clemmer, 166 F. 2d 963 (App. D.C. 1948).
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of Columbia court could impose sentence. The refusal of that court to
accept a plea of nolo contendere did not deprive the court of jurisdiction
to sentence. Justice Wilbur K. Miller stated: "Rule 20 gives to the
district court in which the arrest was made jurisdiction to receive a plea
of guilty or nolo cotendere." Moreover: "The only eventuality as to
pleas which would oust the jurisdiction of the court to which the papers
had been sent is a plea of not guilty .... The mere fact that there was
a desire to plead only nolo contendere did not diminish the court's power
to receive either that plea or a plea of guilty .... He could have ousted
the court of jurisdiction by pleading not guilty, but he chose the guilty
plea.""
History of Rule 20
The history of Rule 20 in the Advisory Committee drafts indicates
careful consideration by the Committee of the constitutional problems
involved. The first draft, dated September 8, 1941, made no provision
for transfer of cases for guilty plea. Instead, Rule 82, modeled on Civil
Rule 82, provided that jurisdiction and venue were unaffected by the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. This provision was not repeated in any
later draft. The second draft, dated January 12, 1942, was also silent,
as was the third, dated March 4, 1942. The fourth draft, dated May 18,
1942, was the first draft providing for transfer. Rule 33 (b) provided
for transfer in language essentially similar to that of Rule 20. The
fifth draft, dated June, 1942, in its Rule 33 (b) was to the same general
effect, as was the sixth draft, dated the winter of 1942-1943, in its Rule
43 (d) (1). None of these last three drafts provided for representation
by counsel as a prerequisite to the validity of the waiver. The fifth and
sixth drafts cited Patton v. United States as authority.9
Rule 40 (c) (1) of the First Preliminary Draft, dated May 1943 (the
seventh committee draft), provided for transfer from the district for
plea and sentence with the consent of the defendant "if represented by
counsel." The note to the Rule stated, after pointing out that this
introduced a change in the old law: "In this connection compare gener-
ally Patton v. United States.'
0
The Second Preliminary Draft, dated February 1944 (the eighth
committee draft), provided for such transfer in Rule 22 but, like the
present Rule 20, and the first three drafts on transfer, laid down no
8id. at 965.
9281 U.S. 276, 50 Sup. Ct. 253 (1930).
10I stated in my article, Orfield, The Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 22 Tax. L. REv. 194, 215 n. 310 (1944): "This should be valid on the analogy
of waiver of trial by jury."
1948]
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requirement of representation of counsel. 1 The Note to the Rule stated:
"It is consistent in principle with other rules which reduce the strictness
of procedural limitations based on district boundaries. Compare Rules
4 (c) (2), 9 (c) (1) and 42 (a)." Rule 4 (c) (2) provided: "A warrant
may be executed or a summons may be served at any place within the
jurisdiction of the United States." Rule 9 (c) (1) laid down a similar
rule as to warrant or summons following indictment. Rule 42 (a) abol-
ished the requirement in the old practice that there be a removal pro-
ceeding between districts in the same state or between nearby districts
in different states.
Rule 22 of the Report of the Advisory Committee, dated July 1944
(ninth draft), was similar to Rule 22 of the Second Preliminary Report
just mentioned.
The Merits of the Rule
The Rule is a very favorable one to criminal defendants. It permits
a speedy disposition of the criminal proceeding against the defendant
in cases where he desires speed. It is of great value where he is unable
to provide bail. It saves him the ignominy of being returned to the scene
of his crime in custody. If he changes his mind and wishes to plead not
guilty instead of guilty, the case will be retransferred to the district of
commission of the crime. The Rule is admittedly not the most favorable
to the defendant that it could be, as there can be no transfer without
the consent of the United States Attorneys of both districts. With
respect to waiver of indictment the prosecution may insist on indict-
ment; and with respect to waiver of trial by jury the prosecution
and the court may insist on trial by jury. Nor is the defendant to have
the right to counsel. That would involve delay in obtaining the transfer;
moreover, the defendant can change his plea to not guilty and have the
transfer set aside. The defendant's statement of consent is not required
to be made in open court and after being advised by the court of his
constitutional rights. Again the answer is that the defendant can change
his plea to not guilty and have the transfer set aside, and the "defendant's
statement shall not be used against him unless he was represented by
counsel when it was made." Any requirement that the statement be
made in open court would make for delay. No doctrine of implied waiver
is laid down since the Rule calls for certain specific conduct by the
defendant to constitute a waiver.' 2
i1 The Advisory Committee felt that the requirement of representation by counsel would
result in unnecessary delay. Orfield, The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 CALIF. L.
Rav. 543, 563 n. 90 (1945).
12This would meet the assertion of Fee, J., that "it will be claimed that the defendant
[Vol. 34
FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULE 20
The Rule is fair to the Government since it permits a speedy disposition
of the case where the Government desires speed?3 It benefits the Govern-
ment financially by avoiding the unnecessary expense of transporting a
prisoner under guard, in many cases thousands of miles, solely for the
purpose of entering a plea of guilty in the district court where the in-
dictment was returned. The transfer may not be made unless the United
States Attorneys for both districts approve of it. It is not to be assumed
that they will approve a transfer where the interests of the community
require that the defendant should be sentenced by the court at the scene
of the crime. It is to be assumed that waiver will be permitted when
the defendant has no prior criminal record or the crime and its penalty
are not serious. The district judge may force a retransfer since under
Rule 11 he may reject a plea of guilty.
It may be contended that the Rule should require the approval of the
Attorney General, as well as the United States Attorneys, on the ground
that the Attorney General has a better over-all picture of the prosecution
than anyone else, but this would involve additional delay. Moreover, the
Attorney General exercises "general superintendence and direction" over
the district attorneys "as to the manner of discharging their respective
duties."' 4
It has been argued against the merits of the Rule that under it a
defendant might be arrested in a district where the average sentence
imposed for a particular crime was lighter than in the district of its
commission; and that defendants will choose the districts of prosecution.
However, the consent of the United States Attorney for the latter district
is a prerequisite and it should be assumed that he will do his duty.:5
Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the sentencing policies of the
distrit of commission are the correct ones.
It has also been argued that Rule 20 increases the possibility of delay,
since the defendant could have the indictment transferred to the district
who has not demanded trial in the state and district designated by the Constitution has
not only waived his right, but the right of the people to have the trial in the vicinage."
United States v. Bishop, 76 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D. Ore. 1948).
.
3
"Rule 20 authorizes a new time- and trouble-saving procedure for the benefit of a
defendant arrested in a district other than that in which the prosecution was instituted
who desires to plead guilty and have sentence imposed in the district in which he is found.
Adequate protection for the interests of the government as well as of the defendant without
counsel is provided." Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE
L. J. 197, 224 (1947).
1 4
REV. STAT. § 362 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 317 (1946).
15Note, 36 GEo. L. J. 263, 265 (1948). It might also be argued that defendants managing
to escape from the district of the crime avoid the publicity and the stigma attending to
those arrested and prosecuted in the district of the crime; and that when the defendant
is sentenced elsewhere than the district of the crime, the effect of deterring others from
like offenses is lost; see the statement of Fee, J., in United States v. Bishop, 76 F. Supp.
866, 870 (D. Ore. 1948).
1948]
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of arrest, then plead not guilty and have all the records returned to the
district of commission.'0 Thus there would be much expense, trouble,
and delay. The Rule is, however, intended to give the defendant the
maximum protection and to insure him trial at the place of commission
if he wants a trial. The statistics of transfer up to now do not, as far
as I know, indicate abuse of the Rule by defendants. It would scarcely
do to deprive the defendant of the right to withdraw his plea of guilty.
Even when all the events occur in the same district-crime, arrest, and
plea of guilty-the defendant may withdraw his plea of guilty under
Rule 32 (d).
It may be contended that where there are several co-defendants in a
criminal proceeding all defendants should plead or be tried by the same
court.'7 If this be a valid principle, the United States Attorneys for the
districts of crime and of apprehension, can take account of it in deciding
whether to consent to the transfer.'8
Rule 20 has been frequently used. The Annual Report of the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for September
1947 states: "Almost 1,000 defendants took advantage of Rule 20 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and had their cases transferred
from the district in which they were originally charged to the district
of arrest for plea and sentence."' 9
Rule 21 (a) permits the transfer of a case to another district upon
motion by the defendant and a showing that such prejudice against him
exists in the district that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.
Of course, if Rule 20 is invalid, Rule 21 (a) likewise is invalid to the
extent that it permits a transfer to another district.20 Likewise subject
16Note, 36 GEo. L. J. 263, 265 (1948).17 The Oregon federal court construes Rule 20 as not applying where the indictment
joins multiple defendants, as the intent of the Rule is that the whole case should be
transferred. United States v. Bishop, 76 F. Supp. 866, 870 (D. Ore. 1948); see Note, 16
U. or CIII. L. Rav. 187, 192 (1948).18
"The sound public policy laid down as to multiple defendants indicted for one appar-
ently continuous transaction can be carried out by directing the United States Attorney
not to countenance or allow his name to be used in connection with an application for
transfer under Rule 20." Fee, J., in United States v. Bishop, 76 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D. Ore.
1948).
1 9 ANTNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADm xsTRATivm OF'F'ICE OF U. S. COURTS 3
(1947). Mr. Leland L. Tolman, of the Administrative Office, stated in a letter to the
author dated December 18, 1947, "In the fiscal year 1947, 911 cases were received by transfer
under the Rule." See Attorney General Clark, An Indorsement of Federal Rides of Criminal
Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 305, 306 (1946).
2O1n Kersten v. United States, 161 F. 2d 337, 339 (C. C. A. 10th 1947), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 851, 67 Sup. Ct. 1744 (1947), Rule 21 (a) was applied with no questioning of its
validity. In the particular case the change of venue was refused and the appellate court
upheld the refusal as being in the sound discretion of the trial court. In a later similar
case, Circuit Judge Bone seems to uphold transfer to another district or division when
he says: "Venue is fixed by law. A proper showing and strict conformity with the statute
are essential to a proper exercise of the power of the court to transfer the proceedings to
another district or division." Shockley v. United States, 166 F. 2d 704, 709 (C. C. A. 9th
1948).
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to attack might be Rules 4 (c) (2) and 9 (c) (1) providing that a war-
rant may be executed or a summons may be served at any place within
the jurisdiction of the United States, and not simply in the district of
issuance. Also subject to attack might be Rule 40 (a) abolishing the
requirement of the old practice that there be a removal proceeding be-
tween districts in the same state or between nearby districts in different
states.
2
'
The English Rule Compared
Federal Rule .20 finds support in the present English rule as to venue.
By the Criminal Justice Act, 1925, a defendant charged with an indict-
able crime may be indicted, tried, and punished in any county or place
in which he is arrested as if the crime had been committed in that county
or place.2 Thus the English rule includes indictment and trial, as well
as pleas of guilty. Rule 20 is a much less sweeping innovation. The
English Rule is not new, as by 1885 many statutes had made a large
number of crimes triable at the place of arrest.a
Rules of Substantive Law and Jurisdiction Distinguished
When Congress authorized the Supreme Court to lay down rules of
criminal procedure it did not intend to authorize it to lay down rules
of substantive law or jurisdiction. Hence, if Rule 20 be a rule of sub-
stantive law or jurisdiction, the mere inaction of Congress on the Rule
submitted by the Supreme Court would not make the Rule become
operative.
That a rule as to place of trial involves a matter of procedure, more
- particularly practice, is indicated by Circuit Judge Foster in Fullerton
v. Government of the Canal Zone.2 4 Congress had vested the President
with the power to prescribe rules of practice for the District Court in
the Canal Zone. The President prescribed a rule for a change of venue
to another division of the district on the application of either the Govern-
ment or the defendant. Defendant contended that the rule was "not a
rule of practice." The court replied: "The provision for a change of
venue from one division of the court to another is as much a rule of
practice as a provision for the granting of a new trial or an order pre-
2 1As to another part of Rule 40, after referring to the constitutional guarantees as to
the place of indictment and trial, Fee, J., states: "It may be feared the attempt to distort
Rule 40 (b) (3), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to sanction removal of a person
to a state where he had never been, had the same motivation." United States v. Bishop,
76 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D. Ore. 1948).2 2 Criminal justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 GEo. V, c. 86, § 11 (1). See OROLD, CRIMMrAL
PROCEDURe -FROM ARRFST TO APPAL 353-54 (1947). For the earlier English practice and
statutes, see Blume, The Place of Trial in Criminal Cases, 43 MitEC. L. R v. 59, 60-63 (1944).2 3Burrows, Criminal Law and Procedure, 51 L. Q. REv. 36, 52 (1935).
248 F. 2d 968, 970 (C. C.A. 5th 1925).
1948]
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scribing the form of pleadings, delays for answer, or the time in which
an appeal may be taken."
The majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter in United States v. John-
son may on first impression seem to limit the place of trial. 5 He stated:
"Questions of venue in criminal cases, therefore, are not merely matters
of formal legal procedure. They raise deep issues of public policy in
the light of which legislation must be construed. If an enactment of Con-
gress equally permits the underlying spirit of the constitutional concern
for trial in the vicinage to be respected rather than to be disrespected,
construction should go in the direction of constitutional policy even
though not commanded by it."25 The justice does not say that juris-
diction was involved. Nor did he say that a rule of court which is
unambiguous is required to be construed narrowly under the consti-
tutional provisions as to venue.
In Sibback v. Wilson & Co., theSupreme Court upheld the validity
of Rule 35 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
for the making of an order in an action requiring a party whose mental
or physical condition is in controversy to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician.26 Merely because a rule affects important
and substantial rights of the parties does not mean that it abridges sub-
stantive rights of the parties. "The test must be whether a rule really
regulates procedure,--the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them." 8t
An example of what would be a rule governing jurisdiction rather than
procedure is to be found in United States v. Sherwood." There Mr
Justice Stone stated: "But we think that nothing in the new rules of
civil practice so far as they may be applicable in suits brought in district
courts under the Tucker Act authorizes the maintenance of any suit
against the United States to which it has not otherwise consented. An
authority conferred upon a court to make rules of procedure for the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not an authority to enlarge that
jurisdiction .... "27.
A unanimous .decision of the Supreme Court by Chief Justice Stone
upholding the validity of Rule 4 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure would seem to indicate similar approval of Criminal Rule 20.
25323 U.S. 273, 65 Sup. Ct. 249 (1944). Four justices dissented, favoring a broader
construction of the statute as to venue.
25.Id. at 276, 65 Sup. Ct. at 251.
26312 U.S. 1, 61 Sup. Ct. 422 (1941).2 6
'1d. at 14, 61 Sup. Ct. at 426.
27312 U.S. 584, 61 Sup. Ct. 767 (1941).
27'Id. at 589-90, 61 Sup. Ct. at 771.
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In Mississippi Publishing Corporation v. Murphree, the court held that
this rule, in providing that process may be served anywhere within the
territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held, did
not contravene the provisions of the Enabling Act authorizing the Su-
preme Court to prescribe such rules.2" In fact "Congress could provide
for service of process anywhere in the United States."29 This is true
although the service of the summons is the procedure by which the court
"asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served."3 Rule 4 (f)
"does not operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision
by which that court will adjudicate its rights. It relates merely to the
manner and the means by which a right to recover .. .is enforced." '31
Guilty Plea Distinguished from Trial
At the outset it should be noted that the defendant was neither in-
dicted32 nor tried in a district other than that of commission of the
crime. Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark states that the constitutional
provisions require "trial of all crimes ... in the state and district where
committed. ' 33 It is true that he adds: "Though these provisions refer
only to the trial, no one has yet attempted to separate process from trial
and make the former extend beyond the district." He was, however,
speaking before the adoption of Rule 20.
In Logan v. United States, it was held that an act of Congress re-
quiring courts to be held at three places in a judicial district, and offenses
to be prosecuted in the divisions where they were committed, did not
affect the power of the grand jury, sitting at those divisions, to present
indictments for offenses committed anywhere within the district.84 The
Court stated by Justice Gray: "The finding of the indictment is no part
of the trial."35 Even before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
indictments could be transferred within the district.3
28326 U.S. 438, 66 Sup. Ct. 242 (1946), 19 So. CAIaI. L. REv. 460.
29326 U.S. 438, 442, 66 Sup. Ct. 242, 244 (1946). Thus Criminal Rules 4 (c) (2) and
9 (c) (1) providing for execution of the warrant or service of the summons at any place
within the jurisdiction of the United States seem valid.
30326 U.S. 438, 444, 66 Sup. Ct. 242, 245 (1946).
311d. at 446, 66 Sup. Ct. at 246.3 2Waiver of indictment at place of offense was held valid in Parker v. Commonwealth,
12 Bush 191, 196 (Ky. 1876). Note, 46 MIcH. L. REV. 964, 965 (1948), concludes that in-
dictment must occur at the place of the crime.
33 Weinberg v. United States, 126 F. 2d 1004, 1006 (C. C. A. 2d 1942). Italics added.
Arguably, U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2, cl. 3 refers only to trial by jury and not to trial
without a jury. See Note, 48 CoL. L. REV. 939, 941 (1948).
34144 U.S. 263, 297, 12 Sup. Ct. 617, 627 (1892).
35This statement was repeated in Post v. United States, 161 U.S. 583, 587, 16 Sup. Ct.
611, 613 (1896). This would seem to meet Judge Fee's statement: "The finding of the
indictment is an essential ingredient of the trial." United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603,
609 n. 15 (1947). See Note, 46 MIcH. L. REV. 964, 967 (1948).
3634 STAT. 207 (1906), as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 114 (1946). This provision is omitted
from the 1948 revision of Title 28 because FEn. R. Csm. P., 19 fully covers such transfers.
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That Congress has not forbidden procedure for transfer of a case to
another district for plea and sentence may be seen from the provisions
of §§ 876 and 3239 of Title 18, United States Code, under which Con-
gress provided that a defendant could move to transfer a case to the
district where the mailed matter was set in motion. It is necessarily
involved in this provision that the indictment would be returned in a dis-
trict different from that in which the trial would take place. Thus there
is the same situation as arises under Rule 20.
Venue Distinguished from Jurisdiction
One of the soundest and clearest expositions of the differences between
jurisdiction and venue is that of Dean Edward S. Stimson.3 "Some
courts, in applying the rule that the courts of one state will refuse to
try persons charged with violating the criminal laws of another state,
say that they do not have jurisdiction. This is inaccurate. These courts
have authority to try criminal cases and therefore have jurisdiction over
the subject matter. We have already seen that jurisdiction over the person
of the accused depends upon custody of his person. A state having phys-
ical control over a person has power to try him for a violation of foreign
law, even though it does not choose to do so. The rule expresses a
policy. It is not based on lack of jurisdiction or power over the person
of the accused. It is a doctrine of forum non conveniens in criminal
cases.
)
Federal Circuit Judge Dobie has pointed out the difference between
jurisdiction and venue in the federal courts. "Venue has reference merely
to the place of the suit. Jurisdiction is a question of the power of a court;
venue, of locality. Jurisdiction controls the judicial capacity to hear the
case; venue answers the only question of where the case should be heard.
The jurisdiction of the United States District Court concerns the various
classes of cases that this court can decide, and defines and limits the
powers of the United States District Court as a part of the judicial ma-
chinery of the Federal government.""8 He further points out that while
37STIMsoN, CONFLICT OF CRnImTA. LAWS 24-25 (1936). "When all of the facts in the
crime-chain occur within a single state, questions of the place of punishment are questions
of venue." Note, 39 HARv. L. REv. 492, 493 (1926).3 8 Dobie, Venue in the United States District Court, 2 VA. L. REv. 1 (1914); see Note,
48 CoL. L. REv. 939, 943 (1948).
Mr. Justice Brown once stated: "Jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate a case upon the
merits, and dispose of it as justice may require." The Resolute, 168 U.S. 437, 439, 18
Sup. Ct. 112, 113 (1897).
"Jurisdiction over criminal offenses means the power of a given court to inquire into
and determine whether or not an alleged offense has been committed by a designated
accused person, and to apply the penalty for an offense so determined." Levitt, Jurisdiction
Over Crimes, 16 J. CRam L. & CRIMINOLOGY 316, 319 (1925). See ScoTT, FUNDAMENTALS
OF PROCEDURE 24 (1922).
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jurisdiction cannot be waived, venue "on the other hand, is merely a
personal privilege, which, if waived by the parties, can not be questioned
by the judge, and this is true even though the venue is manifestly
improper.)3 9
Judge Dobie seems to treat the constitutional provisions as dealing
with venue when he says: "So striking is the importance of venue in
criminal cases that the most far-reaching provisions on this subject are
found in the Federal Constitution. The Sixth Amendment provides that
the trial shall be in the State and district in which the crime is com-
mitted.",4°
A civil case in the federal courts is helpful in differentiating venue
from jurisdiction.41 There District Judge Knight stated: "It is understood
that jurisdiction and venue were not to be confused. The former is the
power to decide a case upon its merits and the latter relates to the place
where suit may be heard."
Wavability of Venue in State Courts
Judge Fee admits that "under the decisions of many states criminal
venue is a privilege of the defendant, ' 42 but concludes: "this circum-
stance establishes no precedent in the federal system, for state courts
are looked upon as a unity and furthermore, they have general juris-
diction."48 The annotation cited by Judge Fee concludes: "The courts
have uniformly taken the view that an accused's rights as to place of
trial, arising under a constitutional provision expressly granting or guar-
anteeing to persons accused of crime the right to be tried in, or by a
jury of, the county or district in which the offense was committed or is
alleged to have been committed, may be waived." 44 The argument that
the court has no jurisdiction "has been rejected by the courts." 45 The
annotation expressly confined itself to state cases, but did make reference
to a single federal case. In that case it was held that the benefit of a
federal statutory provision providing for trial in the county as to capital
3 9Dobie, Venue in the United States District Court, 2 VA. L. Rxv 1, 2 (1914).
401d. at 4.
41Toulmin v. James Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 512, 515 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).
42The history of the state constitutional provisions as to venue is sketched in Blume,
The Place of Trial of Critninal Cases, 43 MIcHr. L. RE V. 59, 67-94 (1944).4 3United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D. Ore. 1947).4 4See Note, 137 A.L.R. 686, 687 (1941). Cases are cited from Colorado, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin. No contrary authority is cited, except for some dubious Louisiana cases. See
KEIGWIN, CASES Ir CRMUInAL PROCEDURE 90 (1939); S'MssoN, CONFLICT OF CRMIN.AL
LAws 22 n. 53 (1936); 14 Am. JuR., Criminal Law § 233 (1938); 22 C. J. S. 267 § 176
(1940).4 5See Note, 137 A.L.R. 686, 691 (1941). A statute providing that allegations of
venue in the indictment shall be taken as true unless the defendant denies the same by plea
in abatement was upheld in State v. Oliver, 186 N.C. 328, 119 S.E. 370 (1923).
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offenses 46 was a mere personal privilege conferred upon an accused which
could be and had been waived. District (later Circuit) Judge William
Clark has stated: "Venue was an essential element in indictment and
trial by jury and venue is no longer an essential element in indictment
and trial by jury."47 He further stated: "We conclude that the inter-
pretation of personal privilege is valid and that that privilege must be
viewed in the light of the reason for its grant.' 48 The court did not
distinguish between the venue prescribed in a statute and the venue pre-
scribed in the Constitution. Mr. Justice Story stated in 1820: "The right
to a trial in the county where the offense is committed, is a privilege
granted to the prisoner: he is not bound to insist upon it, unless he
chooses. He may waive it and require an immediate trial. '49
Change of venue not only at the request of the defendant, 0 but even
at the request of the government, has been permitted in most state
decisions on the matter.5 The United States Supreme Court found no
federal objection to such a state statute, and did not regard such a
statute as ex post facto though passed after the commission of the crime. 2
In a 1945 opinion containing a detailed historical discussion, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the state legislature could, if it chose,
confer a right on the prosecution to a change of venue.18
The liberalizing tendencies of the state courts are indicated by
decisions upholding and applying statutes providing for the summoning
4636 STAT. 1100 (1911), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 3231 (Supp. 1948).4 7United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450, 457 (D.N.J. 1937); see Dobie, Venue in
Criminal Cases in the United States District Court, 12 VA. L. REv. 287, 291 n. 17 (1926).
In Ledbetter v. United States, 170 U. S. 606, 613, 18 Sup. Ct. 774, 776 (1898), Mr.
Justice Brown stated: "Properly speaking, the indictment should state not only the county,
but the township, city or other municipality within which the crime is alleged to have
been committed. But the authorities in this particular are much less rigid than formerly.
Under the early English law, where the jurymen were also witnesses and were summoned
from the vicinage, it was necessary that the locality of the crime should be stated with
great particularity in order that the sheriff might be informed from what vicinage he
should summon the jury. But this requirement was long since abolished in England."
48United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450, 459 (D.N.J. 1937), aff'd, 103 F. 2d 857
(C.C.A. 3d 1939), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642, 59 Sup. Ct. 1044 (1939).4 9 United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 650, 654 (C. C.R.I. 1820).
5OProfessor Perkins points out that to deny waiver of venue "would cut off the right
to a change of venue." Perkins, Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal Cases, 16 IowA L. REv.
20, 23 (1930).
51 See Notes, 80 A.L.R. 355, 357, 359 (1932), 46 CoL. L. REv. 136, 138 (1946), 25 GEO.
L.J. 1036 (1937), 54 HARv. L. Rev. 679, 680 (1941), 17 IowA L. RaV. 399, 400 (1932).
A federal court upheld this as to the Canal Zone in Fullerton v. Canal Zone, 8 F. 2d 968,
970 (C. C. A. 5th 1925). See ORMaD, CRnDWA. PRocEDuRE FRom ARREST To APPE.AL 367-68
(1947).5 2Mr. justice Field stated: "An ex post facto law does not involve, in any of its defi-
nitions, a change of the place of trial of an alleged offense after its commission." Gut v.
Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 38 (U. S. 1870). Yet the ex post facto clause forbids that a de-
fendant be deprived of any "substantial" right, including procedural changes working to
his disadvantage. Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 YALE L. 3.
723, 728 (1942).5 3Murphy v. Extraordinary Special and Trial Term of Supreme Court, 294 N.Y. 440,
63 N.E. 2d 49 (1945), 46 CoL. L. REv. 136 (1946).
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of the jury from a county or district other than that in which the
prosecution is pending.54
The American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure lays down a
number of rules suggesting a liberal application of rules of venue. Under
§ 239 as to offenses in or against aircraft the trial "may be in any
county over which the aircraft passed in the course of such flight.155
Under § 245 a similar rule is laid down as to offenses committed on a
railroad train or other vehicle. 6 Under § 246 a similar rule is laid down
as to offenses committed on a vessel.57
Decisions Sustaining Waivability of Venue in Federal Courts
There have been a number of recent circuit court decisions suggesting
that the place of trial is a matter of venue, and therefore waivable. In
fact prior to the Bink case no federal decision insisting on trial in the
state of commission of the crime involved a waiver. In Hagner v. United
States, Justice Groner cited favorably a number of state court decisions
permitting waiver in the state courts.58 Referring to Patton v. United
States, he stated: "If, as is thus decided, a person may forego a jury trial
by agreeing to waive a jury, it would, we think, be difficult to sustain
the view that he may not also in the same manner waive the provision
in the same article with relation to the place of trial. Logically it seems
to us to follow that both are in the same category. Whatever sanctity
growing out of established custom obtains with relation to the trial of a
defendant in the vicinage of the crime obtains with equal force with
relation to the right to trial by jury .... ""
Judge Fee states that on appeal the Supreme Court "did not follow
the lower court as to waiver of place of trial and expressly treated the
matter as jurisdictional." 60 But that is putting the holding too strongly.
The Court did not rule at all on this point, simply stating by Justice
54Mosely v. Commonwealth, 27 Ky. 214, 84 S.W. 748 (1905); see Note, 102 A.L.R.
1038 (1936).5 5See Note, 2 So. CA=n'. L. REv. 483 (1929).5 6The Illinois statute was applied in Watt v. People, 126 Ill. 9, 18 N.E. 340 (1888);
see Notes, 11 A.L.R. 1020 (1921), 21 MIcH. L. Rv. 792 (1923).
5 7Nash v. State, 2 Greene 286 (Iowa 1849) held that trial may be had in a county to
which the boat had not yet come when the murder was discovered.
5854 F. 2d 446, 447-48 (App. D. C. 1931).
United States v. Rosenstein, 34 F. 2d 630, 633 (C. C. A. 2d 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S.
581, 50 Sup. Ct. 33 (1930), held that where objection was not made at the time of
examination, a judgment was not reversible because a juror did not reside within the
judicial district. The defendant had waived his right.
United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450, 457-59 (D. N.J. 1937) held that a statutory
right to trial in the county of the offense of kidnapping could be waived.
59Hagner v. United States, 54 F. 2d 446, 448, 449 (App. D. C. 1931) held that the two
constitutional provisions as to places of trial are not "jurisdictional, but were meant and
are to be construed to confer rights -upon the accused which he may forego at his election."6
oUnited States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 608 n. 8 (D. Ore. 1947).
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Sutherland: "In view of this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to con-
sider the further question whether the trial court had jurisdiction to try
the indictment, if construed as charging the commission of an offense
only in Pennsylvania. 8 61
In Gowling v. United States, Circuit Judge Hicks stated: "The
question of venue was not raised until after conviction, and therefore
came too late. '6
2
In United States v. Strewl, Circuit Judge Learned Hand stated: "We
do not say that the District Court for the Northern District of New
York had as little jurisdiction over a crime committed in the Southern
District, as though that were the territory of another sovereign: Section
41(2) of Title 28, U.S. Code, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(.2) gave it jurisdiction
generally over all 'crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of
the United States.'.... "6 Thus, Judge Hand does not necessarily accept
Judge Fee's theory of the absolute separation and independence of each
federal district.64 Nor does he necessarily accept his theory that the
constitutional provision defines jurisdiction, for he says, "we do not
suggest" that the provision "be treated as defining jurisdiction," and,
"we therefore leave open any question of jurisdiction." He does not
reject the analogy of waiver of trial by jury for he states: "The interest
at stake in a jury of twelve is no greater than that in a jury of the
vicinage . . . of the two it is indeed the less important, and if consent
is necessary for the surrender of one, consent is equally necessary for
the other." No consent to another place of trial was found, so that it
was not strictly necessary to pass on the validity of any such consent.
A very clear decision that the constitutional provision deals with venue
and not jurisdiction, and that the place of trial is a personal privilege
which is waivable is that by Circuit Judge Phillips in Mahaffey v.
Hudspeth.65 He stated, "Sec. 2 of Art. III of the Federal Constitution"
deals "not with jurisdiction but with venue." He cited 28 U. S. C.
§ 41(2) which expressly confers on district courts jurisdiction "of all
crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United
States."66 Referring to the Patton case he stated: "It follows, we think,
6 1Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 433, 52 Sup. Ct. 417, 420 (1932).6264 F. 2d 796, 798 (C.C.A. 6th 1933).
6399 F. 2d 474, 477-78 (C. C. A. 2d 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 638, 59 Sup. Ct. 489
(1939). 18 U. S. C. § 3231 (Supp. 1948) now replaces 28 U. S. C. § 41 (2) (1946).64 Nor does Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark who states: "With very few exceptions,
United States district judges possess no extraterritorial jurisdiction." Weinberg v. United
States, 126 F. 2d 1004, 1006 (C. C. A. 2d 1942). See Note, 48 CoL. L. REV. 939, 942 (1948).
65128 F. 2d 940, 942 (C. C. A. 10th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 666, 63 Sup. Ct. 76
(1942). Professor Blume states: "Article 3 contains a simple provision for venue." Blume,
The Place of Trial in Criminal Cases, 43 MIcH. L. REv. 59, 60 (1944).6OSec. 340 of the Criminal Code provides: "The crimes and offenses defined in this
title shall be cognizable in the district courts of the United States as prescribed in section
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that the provisions of § 2, Art. III, respecting the place of trial is also
a personal privilege which may be waived."
In United States v. Zeuli, Circuit Judge Learned Hand, while finding
no waiver in the case before him, pointed out that the Circuit Courts of
Appeal for the District Court of Columbia and the Tenth Circuit had
found that an objection to the place of trial could be waived.67 He
stated: "It is true that two circuit courts of appeals have held that an
objection to the venue of a prosecution under § 2 of Art. III of the Con-
stitution and under the Sixth Amendment may be waived, and will be
by going to trial upon the meritS."
6 71
Judge Fee states that, until Rule 20 was passed: "There was no
precedent in the history of the federal government for indictment, trial
and judgment of conviction in any other state and district than the state
and district in which the crime was committed." 68
In United States v. Jones, the Second Circuit even more clearly aligned
itself with the two other circuits permitting a waiver.69 The defendant
claimed his Selective Service Act violation was, according to the indict-
ment, committed solely in Oregon, but he was tried (not simply sen-
tenced) in the Western District of New York. Circuit Judge Frank
stated: "We assume, arguendo, the correctness of this characterization
of the indictment. On that basis, a timely objection pursuant to Art. III,
§ 2 of the Constitution and to the Sixth Amendment should have halted
the trial. But a defendant, thus warned, by the face of the indictment,
of the improper venue, waives the error when he goes to trial without
interposing an objection, as defendant did here."
Thus this case goes even farther than the government's contention in
United States v. Bink. Not only may a defendant be sentenced in a
district and state other than that of commission of the crime, but he
may also be indicted and tried there if he waives the venue.
A very recent case permitting waiver of venue is another Second
Circuit decision, this time decided by Circuit Judge Swan in United
States v. Bushwick Mills.7" Citing the Second and Fourth Circuit and
the District of Columbia decisions he stated: "Objections to venue may
be waived by failure to make them in due season.... The defendants
41 of title 28." 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 18 U. S. C. § 3231 (Supp. 1948). 28 U. S. C. § 41 (2)
(1946) has been repealed.
67137 F. 2d 845 (C. C.A. 2d 1943).
67'1d. at 847.
6 8United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D. Ore. 1947).
69162 F. 2d 72, 73 (C.C. A. 2d 1947); accord, United States v. Swanda, Cr. No. 7626
(D. N. D. 1946), cited in Strine, The New Federal Criminal Rules in Action, 8 FED.. B. J.
190, 193 (1947).
70165 F. 2d 198, 201 (C.C. A. 2d 1947); see Rodd v. United States, 169 F. 2d 54, 56
(C.C.A. 9th 1947).
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were content to let the jury pass upon their guilt under the charge as
given. Only after they had taken this gamble and lost, did they question
the accuracy of the charge. Under these circumstances they should be
held to have waived the errors they now assert with respect to in-
structions as to venue."
The Court of Appeals .of the District of Columbia recently applied
Rule 20 without questioning its validity as to a defendant indicted in
Louisiana and arrested in the District of Columbia. 71 The court stated
that even though the defendant wished to plead nolo contendere instead
of guilty, this "did not diminish the court's power to receive either that
plea or a plea of guilty .... He could have ousted the court of juris-
diction by pleading not guilty, but he chose the guilty plea." A writ
of habeas corpus was therefore rightly refused.
Waiver in General of Rights of Defendant
Judge Fee admits that many other constitutional and statutory rights
may be waived. "The defendant may also waive other guarantees pro-
vided for him such as qualification of talesmen for jury duty, protection
against double jeopardy, confrontation by witnesses, speedy trial, repre-
sentation by counsel, and protection against unlawful searches and
seizures."7 2
Admittedly in civil cases a party may waive the matter of proper venue.
Judge Fee himself states: "In civil proceedings, almost universally the
right to have the action brought in a different locality or a different
court is lost by any move which indicates consent to proceed in the court
where it is brought." 3 Chief Justice Stone stated in 1944: "No proce-
dural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional
right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure
to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction
to determine it."'7
4
The defendant by pleading guilty waived his right to trial by jury
or by the court. Judge Fee concedes that "this does not destroy the power
of the court to proceed to judgment and sentence." 5
Judge Fee concedes that the "right of trial by jury whether in civil
or criminal proceedings" has always been held subject to waiver by
defendant.7 Yet he finds the analogy not persuasive.
71Singleton v. Clemmer, 106 F. 2d 963, 965 (App. D.C. 1948).7 2United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D. Ore. 1947).73 Ibid.7 4 Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444, 64 Sup. Ct. 660, 677 (1944).7 5United States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D. Ore. 1947).
761bid.
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The recent holding and reasoning of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
that waiver of indictment as provided under Rule 7 (b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure is constitutional would seem to point to
a similar result as to waiver of venue for pleas of guilty.7 7 Prior to this
decision it had been held many times that waiver of indictment was
invalid on the ground that the constitutional provision requiring accu-
sation by indictment was a jurisdictional requirement.78 Waiver of jury
trial was formerly held unconstitutional on the same ground.79 Waiver
of indictment was sometimes found unconstitutional on the precedent of
cases denying waiver of trial by jury. Since the jurisdictional theory
is no longer followed as to waiver of jury trial and waiver of indictment,
why follow it as to waiver of venue for a guilty plea?
The failure to file a plea to the jurisdiction before filing of plea of
not guilty in a prosecution for conspiracy to violate the National Pro-
hibition Act was held to waive all objection to the jurisdiction.80
Judge Fee asserts by way of reductio ad absurdum: "If place can be
waived presence of a judge can be waived, and of a tribunal which has
-jurisdiction."'" In reply I would quote my text on criminal procedure:
"At common law the essential elements of trial by jury were: (1) a jury
of twelve men, (2) the presence of a supervising judge with powers to
instruct and advise the jury on the law and facts, and (3) a unanimous
verdict. Since there can be a waiver of the first and third elements,
possibly a waiver shall be permitted at least as to a part of the
proceedings." 82
If the place of trial were a matter of jurisdiction, one would expect
the appellate courts to review though the point was not raised below.
Yet one writer concludes: "A few courts, considering want of venue in
77Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592 (C. C. A. 5th 1947); Note, 21 So. CATr. L. RV.
193 (1948); see United States v. Gill, 55 F. 2d 399 (D.N.M. 1931) (enumerating many
types of permissible waivers).78Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 781 (1887); Renigar v. United States, 172 Fed.
646 (C. C.A. 4th 1909); Ex parte McClusky, 40 Fed. 71 (C.C.D. Ark. 1889);. People
ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E. 111 (1929); Note, 21 So. CALTF. L.
Rav. 193, 194 (1948).79Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86 (C. C.A. 6th 1909); Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y.
124 (1858).
SOFord v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606, 47 Sup. Ct. 531, 535 (1927), citing Albrecht
v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 250 (1927) and Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325, 332, 31 Sup. Ct. 590, 592 (1911). In Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 606,
47 Sup. Ct. 531, 535 (1927), Chief Justice Taft stated: "The issue whether the ship was
seized within the prescribed limit did not affect the question of the defendant's guilt or
innocence. It only affected the right of the court to hold their persons for trial. It was
necessarily preliminary to that trial. The proper way of raising the issue of fact of the
place of seizure was by a plea to the jurisdiction. A plea to the jurisdiction must precede
the plea of not guilty. Such a plea was not filed. The effect of the failure to file it was
to waive the question of jurisdiction of the persons of defendants."
SlUnited States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603, 606 (D. Ore. 1947).
820MLD, CnMrlTAL PROCEDURE FROm ARREST TO APPEAL 377 (1947); see Note, 40
IAc. L. REV. 113, 114 (1941).
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criminal cases as jurisdictional, have reversed on this ground. -The talis-
man of 'jurisdiction' has been used, moreover, to justify reversal for
want of a jury trial, for sentences beyond the statutory limit, or for
defective trial procedure. But these problems should be determined on
their own merits."88
Waiver of constitutional or statutory rights has been upheld in the
following situations: speedy trial,8 4 public trial,8 5 self-incrimination, 6
confrontation of witnesses, 7 presence at trial,88 copy of indictment,89
poll of jury,90 preliminary examination,91 arraignment, 2 opportiinity to
plead,93 right to counsel,94 indictment,95 double jeopardy,96 trial by jury,97
illegal arrest or acquisition of personal jurisdiction," presence of judge, 9
83Note, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1204, 1206-07 (1941); See ORFLD, CRuMMAL APPEALS IN
AIXERICA 96 (1939). The following cases declined review: Gowling v. United States, 64 F.
2d 796, 798 (C.C.A. 6th 1933); State v. Edwards, 151 Kan. 365, 99 P. 2d 836 (1940);
State v. Holder, 133 N.C. 709, 711, 45 S.E. 862, 863 (1903). See Note, 137 A.L. R. 686,
687 (1942).8 4United States v. Ragen, 166 F. 2d 608, 610 (C. C.A. 7th 1948); Collins v. United
States, 157 F. 2d 409 (C. C. A. 9th 1946) ; Pietsel v. United States, 110 F. 2d 817 (C. C. A.
10th 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 648, 60 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1940); Daniels v. United
States, 17 F. 2d 339 (C. C. A. 9th 1927) ; 14 Am. JUR., Crinzminal Law § 138 (1938).
8514 Am. JUR., Criminal Law § 143 (1938).
8 6Powers v. United States, 223 U. S. 303, 32 Sup. Ct. 281 (1912); Fitzpatrick v. United
States, 178 U.S. 304, 315, 20 Sup. Ct. 944, 948 (1900) ; 14 Air. JUm., Criminal Law § 162
(1938).8 7Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442, 32 Sup. Ct. 250 (1912); Grove v. United States,
3 F. 2d 965 (C. C. A. 4th 1925), cert. denied, 268 U. S. 691, 45 Sup. Ct. 511 (1925); 14
Air. JuR., Criminal Law § 188 (1938); Note, 19 MicH L. REV. 439 (1921).8 8Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 Sup. Ct. 250 (1912); FED. R. CP M. P., 43;
ORPIELD, CinNAAx PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 413-17 (1947); 14 Am. Jim.
Criminal Law §§ 199-204 (1938); A. L. I. CODE O:F CRIMNAL PROCEDURE §§ 287-91 (1931).8 9Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106, 48 Sup. Ct. 77 (1927); 14 Am. Jum.,
Criminal Law § 207 (1938).
9014 A . JUR., Criminal Law § 213 (1938).
91 FED. R. CRir. P., 5 (c); OaIsELD, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 51-52
(1947); 14 Am. JuR., Criminal Law § 242 (1938); A. L. I. CODE OF CRIAINAL PROCEDURE
§ 40 (1931).9 2Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 34 Sup. Ct. 456 (1914); Hack v. State, 14
Wis. 346, 124 N.W. 492 (1910); ORPIELD, CR_,-nMAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL
274-75 (1947); 14 Am. JuR., Criminal Law § 255 (1938); A.L.I. CODE or CRUMINAL
PROCEDURE § 206 (1931).
98 ORYELD, CRnMNAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 291-92 (1947); 14 Am. JUm.,
Criminal Law § 260 (1938); A.L.I. CODE Or CRnmAL PROCEDURE § 236 (1931); Note,
13 L.R.A. (N. s.) 813 (1908); cf. Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642, 34 Sup. Ct. 456
(1914).9 4 Bute v. People of Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 675, 68 Sup. Ct. 763, 781 (1948); Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 Sup. Ct. 236 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U. S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1938), 24 IOWA L. RIv. 170 (1938) ; Note, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 270 (1939); ORtELD, CPr&nAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL 426-27 (1947).95 FED. R. CRIM. P., 7 (b), held constitutional in Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592
(C.C.A. 5th 1947); Note, 21 So. CA=. L. REv. 193 (1948); ORsELD, CRMNAL PRO-
CEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 212-14 (1947).
96Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 26 Sup. Ct. 121 (1905).
97 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 63 Sup. Ct. 236 (1942);
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 Sup. Ct. 253 (1930), 24 ILL. L. REv. 339 (1929),
15 MiNN. L. REv. 109 (1930); ORFIEw, CRIMAL PROCEDUR FRO M ARREST TO APPEAL
390-96 (1947); see Griswold, The Historical Development of Waiver of Jury Trial in
Criminal Cases, 20 VA. L. REv. 655 (1934).
UsAlbrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1,,47 Sup. Ct. 250 (1927); ORFIELD, CRI= AL
PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 30-31 (1947).
9 9 0RIELD, CRIDNAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 377-78 (1947).
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unanimous verdict,'O°  protection against unlawful searches and
seizures,'01 challenge of panel of grand jurors,'012 right to demand nature
and cause of accusation, 103 right to trial when defendant pleads guilty,0 4
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, 15 lawfully selected or
qualified petty jury,1°e and admission of improper testimony.10 7
There may be a waiver not only of a single one of the above rights
in the same criminal proceeding, but also of several of them. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant may
waive trial by jury and assistance of counsel.' 8 Perhaps he could not
waive every constitutional right. As stated by Mr. Justice Douglas in
a dissent to the decision just mentioned: "It is the cumulative effect of
the several waivers of constitutional rights in a given case which must
be gauged."' 0 9 Peculiarly in point is a decision of the Indiana federal
court that waiver of indictment and waiver of venue in the same proceed-
ing are valid."0
That waiver is permissible as to virtually all rights of a criminal
defendant is well illustrated in a leading Texas case. The Texas statute
provided: "The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may
waive any right secured to him by law, except the right of trial by jury
in a felony case." The Court of Criminal Appeals stated as to this pro-
vision: "There can be no question but that the legislature had the power
and authority to enact this article, and that it is valid and binding on
this court. This article was first placed in the Code in 1856, and has
been re-enacted by the Legislature in every revision of the Code since
then."' 1
The breadth of the right to waive and the propriety of resort to state
court decisions is indicated by Justice Brewer in Schick v. United
States."2 In upholding waiver of trial by jury, he stated: "When there
1001d. at 483; ROTTSCECAFER, HANDBOOK OF ArERICAn CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789 (1939).
'OlZap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628, 66 Sup. Ct. 1277, 1279 (1946), rev'd on re-
hearing on another ground, 330 U.S. 800, 67 Sup. Ct. 858 (1947); Poetter v. United
States, 31 F. 2d 438 (C. C.A. 9th 1929).
'
0 2 Wright v. United States, 165 F. 2d 405 (C. C. A. 8th 1948).
10 3 pine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812, 835, 93 S. E. 652, 659 (1917).1 04Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 Sup. Ct. 253 (1930); Dickinson v. United
States, 159 Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 1st 1908); McGinnis v. State, 9 Humph. 43 (Tenn. 1848).
lODickinson v. United States, 159 Fed. 801, 806 (C. C. A. 1st 1908).
lO06Johnson v. United States, 225 U.S. 405, 419, 32 Sup. Ct. 748, 753 (1912); Queenan
v. Territory, 190 U.S. 548, 23 Sup. Ct. 762 (1903).
'
0 7 State v. Williams, 197 Iowa 785, 192 N.W. 901 (1923).
'OSAdams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 Sup. Ct. 236 (1942).
1Old, at 281, 285, 63 Sup. Ct. at 242, 244. Justices Black and Murphy concurred in
the dissent.
11OUnited States v. East, 5 F. R. D. 389 (N. D. Ind. 1946). The crime was committed in
Pennsylvania, and the arrest and the plea of guilty were in Indiana.
111Ethridge v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 43, 46, 172 S.W. 786, 787 (1915).
112195 U.S. 65, 72, 24 Sup. Ct. 826, 828 (1904). This language was quoted in Patton
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 310, 50 Sup. Ct. 253, 262 (1930).
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is no constitutional or statutory mandate, and no public policy prohibit-
ing, an accused may waive any privilege which he is given the right to
enjoy. Authorities in the State courts are in harmony with this thought."
The argument that public policy forbids waiver of venue as to plea
of guilty would seem to be met by the language of Justice Sutherland,
as to waiver of jury trial: "The truth is that the theory of public policy
embodies a doctrine of vague and variable quality, and, unless deducible
in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions,
should be accepted as the basis of a judicial determination, if at all, only
with the utmost circumspection. The public policy of one generation
may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another.""
Perhaps the only" 4 constitutional right which is clearly non-waivable
is the right to a written accusation of the crime charged against the
defendant." 5 As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis: "A person may not be
punished for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation even if
he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction."1 6 Not all courts accept this
view, however. The Virginia court has stated that, "The right guar-
anteed by the constitution is the right to demand 'the cause and nature
of his accusation.' If he does not choose to demand it, he is under no
obligation to do so. It is a right that he may waive if he chooses, and
which he will be held to have waived unless he asserts it."" 7
It is sometimes suggested that while the Sixth Amendment speaks in
terms of defendant's right or privilege, still Article II, § 2, speaks
in terms of jurisdiction, thus prohibiting waiver of venue." s In uphold-
1
x
3Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306, 50 Sup. Ct. 253, 261 (1930).
11 4Modern cases do not support the view of non-waivability as to most rights. Notes,
14 CORNELL L. Q. 206, 209 (1929), 25 HARv. L. REV. 179 (1911), 9 MiNX. L. REv. 687
(1925), 18 VA. L. REv. 460, 462-63 (1932). There may be some doubt whether the follow-
ing irregularities can be waived: presence at the trial in capital cases, Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442, 32 Sup. Ct. 250 (1912); change of judges during the trial, Freeman v.
United States, 237 Fed. 732, 744, 759 (C. C. A. 2d 1915), criticized in Note, 29 HARV. L.
REv. 83; conviction of crime not charged in the indictment, Ex parte Dela, 25 Nev. 346,
60 Pac. 217 (1900); unsworn jury, Slaughter v. State, 100 Ga. 323, 28 S. E. 159 (1897).
Thus Fee, J., is speaking only of the past when he states: "Even less important rights
formerly could not be waived." United States v. Bishop, 76 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D. Ore.
1948).
115 See the discussion in ORr'mD, CRurDAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 204-08
(1947). It is also possible that one may not consent to trial by a tribunal other than a
court, or to a sentence not prescribed by law. People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 131
Misc. 411, 414, 227 N.Y. Supp. 142, 149 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd, 249 N.Y. 314, 164 N.E.
111 (1928).
116 Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 250 (1927).
117Pine v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 812, 93 S.E. 652 (1927). Referring to the analogy
of waiver of trial by jury, Professor Waite asks: "Why then is not a trial without a
formal accusation valid, the defendant having consented thereto?" WAITE, CASES ON CIMr-
INAL LAw AND PROCEDURE 667 (2d ed. 1937). See Scott, Simplified Criminal Accusation and
the Supplementing and Amending Thereof, 61 U. OF PA. L. REv. 540, 555 (1913).
1lSHowever, Justice Sutherland stated as to waiver of jury trial in felony cases: "Article
III, § 2, is not jurisdictional, but was meant to confer a right upon the accused which
he may forego at his election. To deny his power to do so is to convert a privilege into
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ing a waiver of trial by jury, Justice Brewer made this answer: "If there
be any conflict between these two provisions the one found in the amend-
ments must control, under the well-understood rule that the last ex-
pression of the will of the lawmaker prevails over an earlier one."' 1 9
The Sixth Amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed .... ,,12o The amendment does not provide that, "No court of
any other state shall try the accused," or that "trial shall be held in the
state where the said crimes shall have been committed." Hence the Sixth
Amendment is not a limitation on jurisdiction. All the other rights ac-
corded by the Sixth Amendment have been held waivable: speedy trial,
public trial, trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, assistance of counsel
and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.' 2 '
The recent decision upholding waiver of indictment seems to be in
line with this reasoning. Circuit Judge Waller stated: "Not only may all
the other provisions in the Fifth Amendment be waived, but it has been
clearly established that the accused may waive the provisions for his
protection in Amendment Article VI. '122
He went on to state with respect to the Fifth Amendment: "It may
be noted in passing that the language of the pertinent part of the amend-
ment is that 'No person shall be held to answer'-not that 'No court
shall hold any person to answer,' as would likely have been the language
had the provision been intended to be a limitation on the jurisdiction
or the power of the court instead of a privilege for the protection of
the individual.' 2
an imperative requirement." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298, 50 Sup. Ct. 253,
258 (1930). The state cases on waiver of jury trial make no distinction based on the
differing language of constitutional provisions for jury trial. Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial
in Felony Cases, 20 CA=. L. REV. 132, 139 (1941); Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury
in Criminal Cases, 25 MIcir. L. REv. 695, 701, 717-20 (1927); Perkins, Proposed Jury
Changes in Criminal Cases, 16 IowA L. REv. 20, 45-47 (1930).
See the construction of the Seventh Amendment as to waiver of jury trial in civil cases
in Bank of Columbia v. Okey, 4 Wheat. 235 (U. S. 1819).
11 9Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-69, 24 Sup. Ct. 826, 827 (1904) ; see United
States v. Johnson, 323 U. S. 273, 275, 65 Sup. Ct. 249, 250 (1944); Callan v. Wilson, 127
U.S. 540, 549, 8 Sup. Ct. 1301, 1302 (1888); Charles P. Curtiss, Jr., Letter to the Editor,
33 A.B.A.J. 1052 (1947).
"The only difference between the Constitution and the amendment is the addition of
the words 'and district.'" United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450, 458 (D. N.J. 1937).
'20Italics added.
12 1 "Broadly speaking, the courts have tended to regard as privileges other constitutional
safeguards of an accused which are almost always found in the same section with the
jury provision. A number of courts have correctly maintained that all these guarantees
should be placed on the same footing with respect to waiver." Oppenheim, Waiver of
Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 MIcEr. L. REv. 695, 702-03 (1927); see Elliott, Waiver
of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 6 CRrm. L. MAG. 183 (1885).
122 Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592, 594 (C. C. A. 5th 1947); Note, 21 So. CAIF. L.
REV. 193 (1948).
122 'Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. 2d 592, 594 (C. C. A. 5th 1947).
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The historical background of the constitutional provisions as to place
of trial indicates that a personal privilege of the defendant was involved.
One of the causes of the Revolutionary War mentioned in the Decla-
ration of Independence was "For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried
for pretended offenses." The fear induced by this practice was still
present in the minds of the people at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution 2 3 They feared a strong government extending beyond the
borders of their states, believing that it might become an instrument
of oppression. The Sixth Amendment was intended to guarantee to the
people the right to have a fair trial in criminal prosecutions at the place
of the crime, so that they could not be transported a great distance from
such places against their will and arbitrarily punished for "pretended
offenses." Similar reasons for the protection of the individual led to the
adoption of the first ten Amendments. The Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." This
statement, coming after the specific provisions in the preLeding eight
Amendments, clearly indicates that the Amendments dealt with indi-
vidual rights, not with jurisdictional limitations. The rights, having been
conferred for the benefit of the individual, may be waived. As was
pointed out in the Patton case, the public interest in their preservation
is not such that the consent of the individual to abandon them will be
overridden.
Necessity of Advice of Counsel
In a companion case, Judge Fee held that no waiver of venue was
permissible when given without advice of counsel' 2 An adequate answer
seems to be that the Supreme Court held that a defendant could validly
waive trial by jury without advice of counsel.1 Moreover the defendant
may change his plea to not guilty in which event the transfer of his case
will terminate. The Advisory Committee did not overlook the matter of
counsel. The First Preliminary Draft (seventh committee draft) pro-
vided for counsel, but later drafts eliminated the provision because of
the likelihood of unnecessary delay. Finally, the holding is dictum since
before the court rendered its decision, the defendant withdrew her con-
sent to transfer of the case for plea and sentence in Oregon. This with-
12See United States v. Parker, 19 F. Supp. 450, 459 (D. N. f. 1937) ; Blume, The Place
of Trial of Criminal Cases, 43 MIcir. L. REV. 59, 63-78 (1944).
1241n re Schwindt, 74 F. Supp. 618 (D. Ore. 1947).
1 25Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 Sup. Ct. 236 (1942), 27
Mn IN. L. REV. 533 (1943); see OPIELD, CRUINAL PROCEDURE FROx ARREST TO APPEAL
395 (1947); Waite, Criminal Law and Procedure-Recent Developments, 44 MICH. L. REV
631, 639-40 (1946).
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drawal of course deprived the Oregon court of any further jurisdiction.
There was no opportunity, therefore, to mandamus or otherwise proceed
further in this case.
Necessity of Statute Conferring Jurisdiction to Accept Plea
As to Judge Fee's holding that express authority must be conferred
on the foreign district court to accept a plea of guilty, it seems sufficient
to quote the language of Justice Sutherland in upholding waiver of jury
trial: "Since, however, the right to a jury trial may be waived, it would
be unreasonable to leave the court powerless to give effect to the waiver
and itself dispose of the case."' 2 Furthermore he pointed out that Con-
gress by § 24 of the Judicial Code "expressly conferred upon the
district courts jurisdiction 'of all crimes cognizable under the authority
of the United States.'" Section 24 "is a broad and comprehensive grant,
and gives the courts named power to try every criminal case cognizable
under the authority of the United States, subject to the controlling pro-
visions of the Constitution." 26" It would seem that Congress may choose
to treat the district courts as a single court for the United States, so
long as it safeguards the defendant's right to trial within the district' 2 7
At one period in our history the jurisdiction of the district courts was
expressly limited to crimes committed within the district. 28 But when
§ 24 of the Judicial Code was enacted no such territorial limitation was
set forth. 2 9 If § 24 may be so construed as to give its apparently in-
tended effect, then Rule 20 is merely a provision for venue and not sub-
stantive law.'3 0
A recent case decided by the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia indicates that the district court of the place of arrest has
jurisdiction to receive a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Circuit Judge
Wilbur K. Miller stated that: "Rule .20 gives to the district in which
126Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 299, 50 Sup. Ct. 253, 258 (1930). But cf.
Note, 16 U. or Cm. L. REv. 187, 190-92 (1948).
126'Sec. 24 of the Judicial Code has been supplanted by 18 U. S. C. § 3231 (Supp. 1948).
12 7The contrary argument would seem to run as follows: There is no statutory basis
for the jurisdiction. The rules cannot confer such jurisdiction. The jurisdictional pro-
visions of the statutes, as read against their background, are limited to cases in which there
is a charge of crime committed- within the district. Assuming that Congress could treat
the district courts as a sigle court for the United States, as yet it has not done so. See
Note, 28 B. U. L. REv. 230, 231-32 (1948).
128REV. STAT. § 563 (1875).
12936 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (2) (1946): "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction as follows: . . . (2) Crimes and Offenses. Of all crimes and offenses
cognizable under the authority of the United States." 18 U. S. C. § 3231 (Supp. 1948) now
replaces this section.
Moreover, under U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §§ 1 and 2, cl. 1, plenary jurisdiction over all
federal matters is vested in the United States courts. See Note, 48 CoL. L. REv. 939, 940
(1948).
13 ONote, 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 443 (1948).
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the arrest was made jurisdiction to receive a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere. . . . the only eventuality as to pleas which would oust the
jurisdiction of the court to which the papers had been sent is a plea of
not guilty. A defendant's statement that he wishes to enter a plea either
of guilty or of nolo contendere, when approved by the attorneys, will
cause a transfer of the papers to the other district."' 3'1
Procedure to Secure Enforcement of Rule 20
It would seem that the order in the Bink case is not appealable. 32 The
defendant is likely to find it more convenient to go back to the district
in which the crime was committed. If the issue is to be raised, it seems
likely that the Government will take the initiative. The Government might
apply for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court of appeals. Or it might
apply to the Supreme Court directly without application to the circuit
court. It is submitted that the latter is the most appropriate remedy.
The Supreme Court would seem to have power to issue the writ directly
to the district court. The holding in Ex parte United States,33 approved
and followed in Ex parte Republic of Peru,"4 indicates that the Supreme
Court has power to issue the writ to a district court in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. In Ex parte United States, the Government
filed an original application in the Supreme Court for a writ of man-
damus to compel a district court to set aside an order denying an ap-
plication for a bench warrant, the granting of which was a purely
ministerial act. Just as the issuance of a bench warrant is a ministerial
act, so is the transmittal of the appropriate papers in a pending proceeding
from the clerk of one court to that of another. Before the Supreme Court
issued the writ, it examined the question of its power to do so, and
concluded that it had the necessary jurisdiction. The Court stated:
"The rule deducible from the later decisions, and which we now affirm,
is, that this Court has full power in its discretion to issue the writ of
mandamus to a federal district court although the case be one in respect
of which direct appellate jurisdiction is vested in the circuit court of
appeals-this Court having ultimate discretionary jurisdiction by cer-
tiorari-but that such power will be exercised only where a question of
public importance is involved, or where the question is of such a nature
131Singleton v. Clenmer, 166 F. 2d 963, 965 (App. D. C. 1948).
13 2United States v. Nationial City Lines, 334 U. S. 573, 594 n. 43, 68 Sup. Ct. 1169,
1180 n. 43 (1948).
133287 U.S. 241, 53 Sup. Ct. 129 (1932), 33 COL. L. RFv. 366 (1933), 1 GEo. WAsr.
L. REV. 548 (1933), 31 MIcHr. L. REV. 996 (1933). Justice Frankfurter, who dissented in
Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 590, 597-98, 63 Sup. Ct. 793, 800, 803-04 (1943),
did not deny the correctness of this decision.
134318 U. S. 578, 584, 63 Sup. Ct. 793, 798 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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that it is peculiarly appropriate that such action by this Court should
be taken."3 5
The circumstances are such that the exercise of a sound discretion
requires the Supreme Court should now decide the validity of Rule 20.
The question is one of large public importance. Since the validity of a
rule promulgated by the Supreme Court is involved, it is peculiarly
appropriate that the Supreme Court should pass on the question.
It is now the practice in Oregon not to comply with Rule 20 in all
cases. The Oregon court will not permit transfer to it of guilty pleas
as to crimes committed in other states."8 Conversely, the Oregon court
did not at first permit transfer to other districts of guilty pleas as to
crimes committed in Oregon."3 7 This attitude may lead other courts and
United States Attorneys to ignore the Rule. As a result the policy
embodied in the Rule will be frustrated.
The only procedure by which the Government may secure an appellate
ruling on the validity of Rule 20 is by mandamus. Prior application to
the circuit court of appeals should not be a prerequisite, since a rule of
the Supreme Court is involved. The Supreme Court stated its policy in
a case involving an application for the writ to compel compliance with
one of the Equity Rules:
"The hearing of these causes in review would normally be had in
the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, and they could
only come here in due course by applications for certiorari and the
granting of them. We do not need to decide whether the intervention
between this Court and the District Court of an intermediate ap-
pellate court would prevent the issue of mandamus by this court
direct to the District Court, in matters in which the Circuit Court
of Appeals would or should ordinarily have power to issue a man-
damus to the same and in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. How-
ever this may be, we think it clear that when the subject concerns
the enforcement of the Equity Rules which by law it is the duty of
this Court to formulate and put in force, and in a case in which this
35287 U. S. 241, 248-49, 53 Sup. Ct. 129, 131 (1932). This statement was quoted by
Chief Justice Stone in Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 584-85, 63 Sup. Ct. 793,
798 (1943). He also stated: "The suggestion that the Judiciary Act of 1925 was intended
to curtail the jurisdiction previously exercised by this Court in granting such writs to the
district courts finds no support in the history or language of the Act."
13GUnited States v. Bink, 74 F. Supp. 603 (D. Ore. 1947).
1 3 7Petition of Mundorff, 8 F. R. D. 7 (D. Ore. 1948). However, subsequently in
United States v. Toliett, 76 F. Supp. 871 (D. Ore. 1948), the Oregon court complied with
the Rule and transmitted the case to the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The court pointed
out that it is the sentencing court (Oklahoma) which must be satisfied that jurisdiction
is present. But the Oregon court retained the original indictment in its files and claimed
the power now or later to bring the defendants before the bar in Oregon, even though
they had been sentenced in some other jurisdiction. Compare the position of the Senior
Circuit Conference which refused to order the recording of a final judgment in the dis-
trict where an indictment had been returned, when trial was had in another district.
.Tudichal Conferences, 33 A.B.A.J. 873, 874 (1947).
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Court has the ultimate discretion to review the case on its merits,
it may use its power of mandamus and deal directly with the District
Court in requiring it to conform to them. Ex parte Abdu, 247
U. S. 27, 28; Ex parte Crane, 5 Peters 190, 192, 193, 194. This
is not to say that in every case where the Equity Rules are the
subject of interpretation and enforcement in the District Court, such
questions may as of course be brought here and considered in a
direct proceeding in mandamus. The question of thus using the
writ of mandamus would be a matter of discretion in this Court,
and it would decline to exercise its power where the issue might more
properly come up by mandamus in an intermediate appellate court
or in regular proceedings on review. If it clearly appeared, however,
that a practice had been adopted by district judges, as to the order
of procedure in hearing causes, at variance with the Equity Rules,
our writ might issue directly to such judges."138
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are of course as much the
progeny of the Supreme Court as were the Equity Rules, and are equally
entitled to the early attention of the Supreme Court. In fact, with respect
to Rule 20, the need for prompt action is much greater. The meaning of
Article III, § 2 and the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution is in issue.
Only the Supreme Court can finally resolve this issue. It should be deter-
mined without delay in the interest of effective and speedy criminal
law enforcement.
138Los Angeles Brush Corp. v. James, 272 U. S. 701, 705-06, 47 Sup. Ct. 286, 288 '(1927).
The same policy is illustrated in McCullough v. Cosgrove, 309 U. S. 634, 60 Sup. Ct. 703
(1940). See Sloss, Mandamus in the Supreme Court, 46 HA1v. L. REv. 91, 101, 121 (1932).
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